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Deter and Engage: Making the Case for Harmel 2.0 as NATO's New Strategy

ULRICH KÜHN

University of Hamburg

Abstract: This intervention argues that NATO needs a new strategy towards Russia. The current strategy is imbalanced because it over-emphasizes power and risks negatively affecting the European security order. A new strategy should recall the 1967 Harmel Report, which successfully combined the security elements of power, order, and liberal values. Today, such a balanced strategy is again needed. A new Harmel strategy (Harmel 2.0) should, like its predecessor, rely on a combination of deterrence and engagement. This intervention thus argues that in the realm of power, NATO needs to respond to Russia's hybrid warfare threats with conventional reassurance and societal soft power measures and that securing the Allies' economic vulnerabilities while leaving NATO's current nuclear posture untouched will also be crucial. In the realm of order, NATO needs to re-engage on cooperative security and the instruments of arms control, and it is argued that a pause to further NATO enlargement would be helpful. Finally, in the realm of liberal values, the Allies should lower their expectations as a gesture of recognition that they cannot change the domestic situation in Russia in the short term, but they should address the attitudes of certain member states in that realm. In order to succeed with such a multi-pronged strategy, the Allies need to better coordinate their policies in the OSCE and amongst EU countries.

Keywords: NATO, Russia, international security, Harmel Report, defence, cooperation

INTRODUCTION

With the war in Ukraine, Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, and the continued Russian intimidation of NATO member states, the days of trying to build a post-Cold War strategic partnership between NATO and Russia seem to be over. Russia has violated a number of central tenets of the European security order, such as the principle of the inviolability of frontiers, and has rhetorically threatened NATO Allies. So far, NATO has reacted by ramping up its defence readiness and suspending the dialogue with Russia at the working level. It seems that Europe is entering a new phase of increased competition and tension. But is NATO really ready for the challenges this new phase brings? When trying to answer this question it is helpful to recall

some historical lessons from the late 1960s, when the Allies decided to rethink their overall strategy towards the Soviet Union.

The so-called Harmel Report of 1967 suggested a well-balanced strategy that reflected three grand schemes of European philosophical thinking about advancing international security: power, order, and liberal values. This successful strategy allowed NATO to blend effective deterrence with a commitment to institutional interdependence and the defence of values, rights and laws, which gave it the moral as well as the military high ground. Today, NATO has deficits in all three realms of security. This is the result of Russia's seemingly unexpected and aggressive power play, certain historical developments in the realm of order, and the Alliance's internal challenges in the economic as well as the societal realm.

NATO's current response to the conflict with Russia is almost solely based on the concept of power. Continuing down this path and not addressing the deficits in the realms of order and liberal values would be potentially dangerous. Such a policy would risk the complete breakdown of Europe's already strained security order, would fail to address NATO's own institutional and liberal deficits, and could provide fertile ground for a military tit-for-tat with Moscow which could easily lead to a renewed arms race.

It is therefore high time to restore the balance between the three essential elements that have made the Harmel Doctrine so successful in the end. European security would benefit from a new Harmel 2.0 strategy that would effectively buttress deterrence and provide channels of communication and engagement with Russia.

In the following sections, I will first develop a tripartite approach to international security based on the grand traditions of Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, and Immanuel Kant and the implications these lines of security thinking have on the conduct of international relations, in which they effectively constitute three "realms" of thought and action. I will then go on to explain the conditions under which the Harmel Report incorporated these ideas. Next, I will use the three "realms" (power, order, and liberal values) to analyse NATO's responses to recent security challenges and to identify its political shortcomings and the inherent problems with these responses. In each case, concrete policy recommendations are provided on how to advance a better strategy, drawing on the example of Harmel's balanced combination of the three realms. The last section will then sum up the arguments and findings and situate them within the unfolding European security context.

THREE REALMS: THREE EUROPEAN TRADITIONS OF SECURITY THINKING

In this section, I will develop a tripartite approach to international security based on the influential work of Hedley Bull.¹ In his seminal account *The Anarchical Society* (1977), Bull argued that modern-day political theorizing draws mainly from three

grand European philosophical traditions – those of Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, and Immanuel Kant. Each of them stressed different aspects of how to ensure or increase security in a state of anarchy. By comparison of the three traditions, Bull's work made it possible to see how states give preference to either one or two of the traditions while, at the same time, neglecting the other one or two. Today, this imbalance in emphasis is exactly the problem with NATO's current strategy. In the following, I will briefly introduce the three traditions and reflect on the likely implications these lines of security thinking have on the conduct of international relations.

THE HOBBSIAN REALM OF POWER

The Hobbesian tradition starts from the premise of *homo homini lupus* ("man is wolf to man"), basically assuming that mankind is trapped in a permanent struggle for power and survival in an environment of anarchy without any central authority guarding against sudden annihilation. In this environment self-help is the order of the day. The stronger one is, the better his or her chances of survival. As this tradition was further advanced in the 20th century through the works of political realists such as Hans Morgenthau (1954) or structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz (1979), proponents of the Hobbesian tradition see international security as a permanent zero-sum game amongst differently situated actors (states) in an international system of states with different capabilities, which aim to advance their position in pursuit of securing their own survival. The security policy tools of states in this international system are concentration on military capabilities, preparation for the state of war, and resistance to any detrimental changes to the existing balance of power. According to Morgenthau (1954: 187), *balance of power* has basically two different meanings: "an approximately equal distribution of power" (such as the state of near-perfect nuclear equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War) and "any distribution of power". Throughout this intervention, the concept of *balance of power* is used to refer to any distribution of power.

The implications of Hobbesian thinking on international security are twofold. First, it leads the proponents of this line of thinking to cautiously guard against any state achieving a relatively better position in comparison to their state's own position in the international system. To quote again from Morgenthau (1954: 174): "the concept of power is always a relative one." David Rousseau (1999: 3) adds that "due to the anarchical nature of the international system any gain in power by one state represents an inherent threat to its neighbours." As a consequence, even defensive measures by one state could become misinterpreted by another state – and this serves as the beginning of an action-reaction cycle that is best described in John Herz's (1950) influential model of the *security dilemma*. In that model, one state's intention to increase its security (through military spending, alliances, or additional deployments) can result in another state's perception of diminished security, which

leads the latter to answer with similar measures. The resulting security dilemma is a spiral of policies with a heightened level of tensions that can lead to conflict – even though neither of the states desired or intended to provoke a conflict. The U.S.-Soviet arms races in the nuclear realm in the 1960s and early 1980s are examples of that kind of security dilemma (Schelling–Halperin, 1961).

These patterns of thinking make international cooperation hard to achieve. Realists agree that even slight changes to the relative distribution of power are problematic. According to Joseph Grieco (1988: 498), “the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities”. Cooperative efforts would thus have to always reflect the underlying (relative) balance of power in order to be acceptable to both of the cooperating parties.

THE GROTIAN REALM OF ORDER

Philosophical thinkers in the Grotian tradition see the maintenance of international order as states’ main security objective. In order to avoid war and secure survival in an environment of anarchy, states engage in diplomatic efforts to craft a legalistic rule-based international order where they can manage their differences through commonly-agreed institutions such as codified agreements or normative rules of conduct. Bull himself was amongst the most influential 20th century thinkers in the Grotian tradition and one of the founding fathers of the English School (cf. Green–Navari, 2014). He promoted the concept of an “international society” (Bull, 1977), which incorporates certain elements of the realists’ conception of an international system, such as the primacy of the nation state, but which also stands in contrast to this conception by arguing for a *society* of states. Stanley Hoffmann (1986: 185), reflecting on Bull’s work, explains that “*system* means contact between states and the impact of one state on another; *society* means (in Bull’s words) common interests and values, common rules and institutions.” Some major elements of Bull’s definition of “international society” are states’ sovereignty, mutual recognition of sovereign equality, and diplomatic conduct amongst states, but also non-interference in states’ internal affairs.

Particularly American liberal institutionalists such as Robert Keohane (1984) or Robert Axelrod (1984) have taken the Grotian tradition forward by stressing the political-economic aspects of institutionalized order for the sake of cooperation amongst states. They argued that international institutions such as “regimes” can provide a stable framework for facilitating agreements because of their repetitive character, the information regimes provide, the accumulated gains over time, and the reduced transaction costs for states. Proponents of this approach have also stressed the added value of economic interdependence (Keohane–Nye, 1977).

Again, the implications of Grotian thinking on international security are twofold. On the one hand, proponents of that tradition are asked to answer the difficult question of what aspects of order they give preference to, particularly since the 20th cen-

ture saw the extension of ordering principles from the level of states to the level of the individual human being (i.e., economic or state-to-state order vs. human rights order). Bull (1977: 151–153) advocated a more sociological-historical approach in that regard, arguing that the toleration of ideological differences between societies would make it easier to uphold international order amongst states. He went as far as to argue that the promotion of human rights standards might open the door for moral claims undermining the existing order, a line of argumentation one finds again these days in the speeches of Russian President Vladimir Putin².

On the other hand, liberal institutionalists tend to overlook the ways in which institutionalized order often favours strong states (or alliances), which act even more powerfully through the related institutions, and the ways that powerful states promote through institutions exactly those principles and norms that are in their national interest (cf. Drezner, 2008; Thakur, 2013). Beyond this, institutions can be directly or indirectly exclusive by their very own nature, thus precluding any broader cooperation (cf. Charap–Shapiro, 2014). The neoclassical realist William Wohlforth (2015: 8) has argued that the United States' security commitments under NATO are exclusionary by definition: "States against which those commitments are directed – especially China and Russia – can never be wholly integrated into the order."

THE KANTIAN REALM OF VALUES

The third grand scheme is the Kantian or liberal tradition, which envisions an idealistic world where people achieve more security through cooperating across state boundaries in order to advance the common goals of humanity, democracy, and freedom. 20th century liberals such as Martin Wight (1977) – the other nestor of the English School – have pointed to the personal level of international interaction which includes individuals, non-state organizations, and the global population as a whole. This concept of a "world society" (Wight, 1977) envisions a development towards a future state of overcoming nation state primacy. It stands in stark contrast to the Hobbesian "dog eat dog" conception and shares with the Grotian tradition the ordering concept of *society*. However, while the Grotians are rather leaning towards the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies' (1926) definition of society as *Gesellschaft* (basically meaning a club with commonly agreed-upon rules), Kantians see society more as *Gemeinschaft* (meaning a group with a certain degree of cultural or moral unity among its members). According to the latter understanding, historically evolved shared values establish a kind of "we-feeling" among the participating states (cf. Wight, 1977; Deutsch, 1957) which can develop in parallel to the Grotian order.

A key problem with this approach to international security is that it postulates a "Western" conception of the primacy of certain human values which might not be universally accepted (cf. Buzan, 2014; Gong, 1984). In parallel to the war in Ukraine, Russian scholars have engaged particularly in this line of argumentation. According

to Alexander Lukin (2014: 52), “the concept of the absolute priority of human rights, which forms the foundation of the West’s dominant ideology [...] is alien to most other cultural traditions [including the Russian Orthodox tradition].” Beyond such more recent criticism, the “problematic agenda of intervention” (Buzan, 1993: 351), which developed during the 1990s (see, for example, the *Responsibility to Protect*), leads to clashes between the current state-centred order of international society and human-centred world society aspirations.

Taken together, states as well as alliances can basically choose from these three traditions of security thinking in order to advance their own security. The co-existence of the three realms makes it necessary for states to somewhat balance or adapt their approaches to them or put different emphases on them in order to achieve their preferred outcomes in an ever changing environment of anarchy. As I will show in the next section, the environment of the late 1960s made it imperative but also possible for NATO to integrate all three traditions into its strategy towards the Eastern bloc, although greater emphasis was placed on deterrence (the realm of power) and engagement (the realm of order).

THE HARMEL DOCTRINE: DETERRENCE, ENGAGEMENT, AND LIBERAL HOPES

This section sketches the international environment that influenced the development and reception of the Harmel Doctrine. The Doctrine is analysed here for the presence of the three realms identified above in it and also for its approaches to them. Reflections are then provided on the subsequent policy choices in order to evaluate the success of the doctrine in delivering on its intended results.

POWER, ORDER, AND PROGRESS: THE THREE REALMS IN THE HARMEL DOCTRINE

Back in 1967, when the then-Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, led the effort to draft a report about “The Future Tasks of NATO” (known as the Harmel Report)³, the Cold War demanded concerted efforts and a strategic solution to face the challenges of the upcoming years (cf. Park, 1986). By that time, much of the international security environment had changed since the end of the Second World War, and one particular change was the United States’ and the Soviet Union’s rapid shift from being in a military alliance to being in a state of enmity. Some NATO members questioned the Alliance’s ability to deter the Soviets. France had withdrawn from NATO’s integrated military command structure. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis had set an extremely negative precedent for how quickly Washington and Moscow might possibly move up the nuclear escalation ladder without any necessary institutional constraints preventing a worst case outcome. In addition, the Allies were faced with defence problems at the exposed areas of the south-eastern flank.

As a response to these challenges, the Harmel Report set the stage for the next several decades by outlining a two-prong strategy based on deterrence and engagement. The doctrine's core concern was the maintenance of an adequate defence of all Allies. This strong base was intended to provide the foundation from which to develop a political agenda of engagement with the Soviet Union aimed at stopping the nuclear arms race and reducing the dangerous tensions between the two blocs. In its very essence the Harmel Report combined the two traditions of thinking in terms of power and order, respectively. The latter was rather loosely connected to the hope that engagement, once fully established, would pave the way to a more resilient peace and security order, thus tacitly hinting at the realm of liberal (human) values.

The Hobbesian tradition is reflected in the Harmel Report in the sense that the first function of NATO is "to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur." (NATO, 1967) The Report goes on to argue that the "Allies will maintain as necessary, a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence." (Ibid.) The realist key words strength, defence, capabilities, and balance of forces indicated the primary purpose of NATO: securing the very survival of Allies through means of strengthened defence.

However, beyond the power realm, the Allies also included the Grotian tradition in the Report by stating that "the ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees." (Ibid.) In the normative realm, the Report unambiguously underlined the following phrase: "from the beginning the Atlantic Alliance has been a co-operative grouping of states sharing the same ideals and with a high degree of common interest." (Ibid.) Cooperative efforts such as *détente* had the aim of pursuing "the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues [between NATO and the Warsaw Pact] [could] be solved". (Ibid.) Arms control was identified as one of the concrete areas of cooperation.

The Allies also tacitly touched upon the liberal/idealist tradition of Kant, though only implicitly. The underlying (idealistic) assumption of the Report was that a change to the better was possible: "The evolution of Soviet and East European policies gives ground for hope that those governments may eventually come to recognize the advantages to them of collaborating in working towards a peaceful settlement."⁴ (Ibid.) There the Allies' hopes reflected an idea of liberal progress that contrasted with the tragic view of Hobbesian realists.

ON BALANCE A SUCCESS: EVALUATING HARMEL

During the years that followed, these strategic goals started to translate into concrete political actions. First, the resulting policy of *dual tracks* allowed NATO members to

reach out politically to the Soviets from a strengthened position of internal military reassurance. The policy of *détente* was further advanced by West Germany, which served in the role of an important East-West interlocutor under its own label of *Neue Ostpolitik* (cf. Bahr, 1963) at a time of volatile American leadership due to domestic quarrels in the United States. Furthermore, the temporary slowing down of the nuclear arms race with the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) created the institutional context for the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks addressing the conventional arms race. Also, the development of a politically binding understanding of the basic principles guiding European security relations – in the 1975 Helsinki Accords of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) – even achieved the mutual politically binding recognition that liberal values such as basic human rights are an integral part of security (cf. Maresca, 1988).

Of course, the Harmel Doctrine could not bridge the fundamental ideological differences in interest between Washington and Moscow. In a way, the Doctrine recognized what Bull had pleaded for: the toleration of ideological differences in the pursuit of upholding international order. Also, the Doctrine could not completely reassure all the Allies at all times (cf. George, 1988). However, it proved to be adaptable to emerging policy challenges because it relied on both power *and* order. During the early 1970s, it undergirded efforts to find a mutually acceptable status quo which would be less prone to dangerous crises along the lines of the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, it allowed NATO to counter the rapidly expanding Soviet intermediate-range missile threat to Europe through NATO's dual-track decision, which exactly followed the deterrence and engagement dichotomy established by the Harmel doctrine: deploying additional nuclear weapons to Europe in order to reassure NATO allies while offering the Soviet Union the option to revoke the deployment if the negotiations with Moscow were to result in a significant decrease of the Soviet missile threat (cf. Eichenberg, 1993).

The Harmel Doctrine's most important accomplishments were, indeed, the avoidance of a complete collapse in communication with Moscow and the continued signalling that cooperation would be possible if only the Soviets would be willing to engage. This policy finally came to full fruition some 20 years after the Harmel Report was issued when, driven in part by the severe economic situation in the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev fundamentally changed course. The already established and institutionalized order allowed both sides to engage in different fora on different security aspects, addressing the most pressing challenges.

There is a consensus among historians and political scholars that the Harmel Doctrine was a success story (Thomas, 1997; Herd-Kriendler, 2013). Its well-balanced approach between the power elements of deterrence and the order elements of engagement paved the way for a period of cooperation (though it was followed by an interim relapse into competition), which even allowed for declaratory accords in the

realm of liberal values. Of course, the accords were merely Soviet lip service, given the harsh realities in the states of the Warsaw Pact. However, NATO Allies knew that they could not change the facts on the ground in those states without risking open confrontation with the Soviets. Even sharp ideological differences did not prevent them from establishing the first elements of the European security order. As I will show in the next sections, the challenges NATO faces today vis-à-vis Russia are somewhat similar but also different. What has not changed, however, is the need for NATO to balance its strategy in order to take account of the various demands of the realms of power, order and liberal values, in which it operates.

THE REALM OF POWER

This section will examine the challenges Russia poses to NATO Allies and analyse their responses in the realm of power. It will begin with a short overview of the current situation that also compares it to the strategic landscape during the days of the Harmel Report. Then it will focus on today's most imminent threats on NATO's North-Eastern flank, which is exposed to Russian tactics of hybrid warfare, and the inherent problems of a power-based approach in relation to the realm of order. Subsequently, I will make the case for not altering NATO's strategy in the nuclear realm, but instead concentrating on economic threats.

Today, NATO finds itself in a regional security situation that is somewhat similar to but also different than that of the late 1960s. After more than 20 years of partnership, Russia and NATO are again trapped in a state of enmity. Today's main concern in connection with this matter is with NATO's North-Eastern flank. NATO's easternmost allies, particularly the Baltic States and Poland, are justifiably concerned (cf. Blair, 2015) about the Alliance's capability and readiness to come to their help in case of military aggression from Russia. Germany is once more acting as an interlocutor, having brokered a cease-fire agreement (however fragile) in Ukraine and leading diplomatic efforts to keep up the dialogue with the Kremlin.

In contrast to much of the period of the Cold War, these days Washington is mostly leading from behind (cf. Carafano–Gardiner, 2015), as it is more concerned with the Middle East and Asia, to say nothing of its own domestic problems and internal political difficulties. After eight years of foreign and security policies that have almost exclusively relied on aspects of power and the promotion of liberal values under the George W. Bush administration, the administration of Barack Obama is much more inclined to re-engage in the Grotian tradition, returning to multilateral institutions and stressing the value of diplomacy (notably in relation to negotiations with Iran on nuclear issues).

Another important difference lies in the realm of institutional order. While the late 1960s only saw the very beginning of the first tentative efforts to establish institutional arrangements to prevent large-scale war, today's security institutions involving

NATO member states and Russia are either deadlocked or in decline (cf. Kühn, 2015; Kelleher, 2012; Zagorski, 2010). As a result of institutional decay on the one hand and political decisions punishing Russia on the other, political communication between Moscow and NATO has been reduced to a minimum. In essence, while during the 1960s a major crisis led to the establishment of order, today, the erosion of order preceded a major crisis.

Furthermore, as during the Cold War, economic sanctions are in play. While the Cold War decisions of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) had a rather long-term effect on the Soviet economy in the realm of high-end industrial-electronic capabilities, today's economic sanctions that are put in place by the EU and individual NATO member states have severely affected the Russian economy even immediately after they were put into effect (cf. Feaver-Lorber, 2015). Today's Russia is economically much more vulnerable than the Soviet Union of the 1960s was, partly due to its greater level of economic interdependence with the West and the wider world. Nevertheless, the economic sanctions do not seem to be quickly leading to the desired outcome of the Kremlin reversing its course (Charap-Sucher, 2015).

The biggest difference from the times of the Harmel Report is that today's NATO cannot rely on a well-balanced and comprehensive strategy vis-à-vis Russia anymore, a strategy which would strike an optimal balance between the three realms of power, order, and liberal values. So far, NATO Allies have prioritized responses in the power realm. This is not at all surprising given the fact that NATO is a collective defence organization which has its primary focus on military capabilities. It is also understandable because Russia has violated at least two of the guiding principles of European security, that is, the non-use of force and the inviolability of frontiers. To be clear, Russia has introduced a completely new quality of insecurity to Europe, which almost inevitably triggers immediate Hobbesian patterns of thinking about security in terms of power. The problem with this approach, however, is that it risks clashing with NATO's equally important policy objective of preserving the last remaining elements of the European security order. This becomes particularly obvious when we look at the possible threats the Baltic States are facing. In addition, the hybrid threats posed by Russia are forcing NATO to extend its defence activities beyond the usual realm of military countermeasures and engage in efforts of soft power.

THE BALTICS AND THE THREAT OF HYBRID WARFARE

As a matter of fact, at NATO's North-Eastern flank the balance of power is to the clear disadvantage of the Alliance (cf. IISS, 2015). This imbalance leads one to speculate that the Russian conventional superiority vis-à-vis the Baltic States would enable Moscow to quickly make inroads towards the Baltic Sea, although the sustainability of such an incursion remains open to question.

In response, in 2014 the Allies agreed to the Readiness Action Plan, which foresees deploying ground troops to the eastern parts of the Alliance for training and exercises on a rotational basis, increasing NATO's Rapid Reaction Force (from 13,000 to 40,000 troops) and setting up a multi-national Spearhead Force the size of a brigade (~5,000) plus Force Integration Units of several dozen command and control troops in six front-line states to prepare the ground for the Spearhead Force (IISS, 2015: 58–59). In addition, the Alliance has increased military manoeuvres in and around the Baltics.

While these measures seem almost modest given the still existing imbalances in the Baltic region, they have serious political implications from the point of view of institutionalized order. To fully grasp the political purview of NATO's assurance measures it is important to recall a number of past decisions first.

In 1997, NATO and Russia concluded the politically binding NATO-Russia Founding Act. Back then, NATO promised not to station "additional substantial combat forces [...] in the current and foreseeable security environment" (NATO–Russia, 1997) at the territories of new member states (which today include the Baltic States). NATO gave Moscow this commitment in response to the Russian unease with the first round of NATO enlargement.⁵ Two years later, in 1999, Russia responded in kind by promising not to station "additional substantial combat forces" (OSCE, 1999) in the military oblasts of Kaliningrad and Pskov, which border the Baltic States.⁶ While a clear definition of "substantial combat forces" is still missing today, in 2008 Russia made clear that the upper ceiling should be at the level of a full combat brigade (~5,000 troops) in each of the Baltic States.⁷

The decisions to militarily reassure the Allies thus mirror two core considerations which could easily clash. First, NATO member states have obviously shied away from robustly changing the balance of power in the Baltic region. Second, the Alliance seems to not have the intention to completely break with the existing order as codified in the Founding Act. As a result, reassurance measures for the Eastern Allies have been on a non-permanent or "rotational" basis, and the Spearhead Force is roughly the size of a full combat brigade, thus being on the verge of what Russia defined as potentially problematic in 2008. These careful decisions also take into account that further increasing NATO forces in the Baltics would indeed strain the Founding Act close to its breaking point.

At the same time, these decisions also recognize the fact that probably most political leaders in NATO do not expect the Kremlin to directly invade one of the Baltic States because the consequence would be open war with the world's largest and most powerful military alliance – including the devastating possibility of limited or, worse, all-out nuclear war. Instead, Russia could make use of its hybrid warfare tactics (see Murray–Mansoor, 2012), as seen in Ukraine, including stoking up protests amongst the large Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, supporting local activists (probably even through disguised civilian "boots on the ground"), staging cyber attacks, manipulat-

ing public opinion through massive propaganda in social networks, manipulating energy prices, encouraging corruption, amassing forces at the common borders, and intimidating NATO Allies with rhetorical threats in the nuclear realm.

None of these tactics are new, and some were employed by NATO as well as the Soviet Union during the Cold War (cf. Leffler–Westad, 2010). What is new is that Russia's wielding of these tools in the post-Cold War era requires NATO to develop a multi-faceted response that goes beyond the traditional military sphere. One of the NATO manoeuvres held in May 2015 in Lithuania, "Operation Lightning Strike", deployed more than 3,000 soldiers and police officers to test the interoperability of military and civilian personnel (Williams, 2015). This exercise already pointed to the difficulty in distinguishing the grey area where NATO states bordering Russia are most vulnerable and where a clear allocation of responsibilities is not yet a given. Potential political uprisings of any sort – be they socially or ethnically motivated – are, first and foremost, cases for national police services. However, if such a situation were to escalate quickly, e.g., if the size of the protests or the level of violence were to increase dramatically or if, in parallel, signs of direct Russian involvement on the ground were to verifiably surface, responses could easily shift from the civilian to the military realm.

Thus, the question arises of whether the Allies could agree to an Article V declaration⁸ that would guarantee that member states would consult with each other and respond according to their capabilities in case of an "armed attack" against any fellow member. What if a *little green men* incursion (i.e., an incursion by concealed regular armed forces; cf. IISS, 2015: 5–8) were to happen in a Baltic state, not with the aim of creating the havoc seen in eastern Ukraine, but with the goal of provoking a possibly lengthy debate in NATO as to whether this is an Article V case – with Moscow recording a victory every day the debate dragged on?

Here the political challenge for NATO is to clarify institutional processes beforehand in order to be able to respond appropriately to an ambiguous hybrid scenario. Another challenge will be to openly communicate to the Kremlin under which circumstances and through which measures NATO would respond to a hybrid scenario. Doctrinal documents are one way to do so. Another way, which would also strengthen the Grotian elements of European security, would be for NATO to work together with Russia on common threat and response definitions in a format such as the OSCE's Forum for Security Co-operation. While NATO must carefully examine and plan its possible responses in a hybrid threat scenario, it must, in the first place, also examine possible ways to prevent it from happening. As will be shown below, the instruments of *soft power* are best suited to achieve that aim.

THE INSTRUMENTS OF SOFT POWER

In response to the increasingly hybrid threats it faces, Lithuania has already made the very sensible move of banning the wearing of military uniforms without permission

in order to prevent a *little green men* scenario (Lithuania Tribune, 2015). However, one of the central characteristics of hybrid warfare is that the concept incorporates aspects of non-kinetic warfare that extend deeply into the realm of civil society (cf. Murray and Mansoor, 2012). Accordingly, defensive measures could just as well work if they were under the responsibility of civil legislation. Here, the instruments of *soft power* come into play. The concept of *soft power*, established in conjunction with the end of the Cold War (Nye, 1990), relates to the wider form of power inasmuch as it concentrates not only on states' military or economic capabilities, but also on cultural and societal attractiveness, ideology, and the orderly effects of international and national institutions such as those in the realm of rule of law.

This sub-section argues that much more needs to be done in the realm of civilian legislation to prevent Moscow from exploiting the potentially precarious composition of the populations in the Baltics. Possibilities for the Kremlin to meddle in the internal affairs of the three countries range from areas such as educational policies to unresolved issues of citizenship. One problem is recurring calls by Estonian or Latvian nationalists to abandon the standards of multilingual education (cf. Mercator, 2012), which thus basically undermine NATO member states' normative understanding of ethnic minority rights. Any attempts to switch from the system of multilingual education, which seems to be without alternative given the high percentages of Russian speakers in Estonia (28%) and Latvia (36%), should prompt immediate and stern reactions by all the Allies. Also, a further problem is that a very high percentage of ethnic Russians in the two countries have not acquired citizenship, which undermines their connections to and belonging within those states (ibid.).

Back in the 1990s, the prospect of accession to the EU provided human rights-monitoring organizations, such as the OSCE, with strong leverage to push the Baltic States towards better integration policies for their various minorities, thus guaranteeing that Western Europe's standard in the realm of liberal values would be safeguarded in the future member states (cf. Galbreath, 2003). Today, however, this economic-political leverage is mostly gone. Thus, NATO member states should continuously work together with the Baltic States to ensure that treatment of their Russian-speaking minorities does not become a serious bone of contention that the Kremlin could exploit. The better these minorities are integrated, the lower the possibility that Russia will (be able to) take advantage of latent tensions in the countries.

Another area where the Allies need to respond is that of the Russian narrative that was so successfully crafted in Moscow – and reproduced by certain Western scholars (e.g., Mearsheimer, 2014) – of the West being responsible for the war in Ukraine. One problem for NATO is that there is today essentially no competition for the distorted version of reality presented by the Russian media to ethnic Russian audiences in Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova and Ukraine. So far, Moscow enjoys “media dominance” in these countries. And the reach of the Russian media goes well beyond

the post-Soviet states. In Serbia – a non-NATO state and a former ally of Russia – large parts of the population obtain their information from Russian state-owned media outlets. The latest polls show that today, for the first time since the toppling of Slobodan Milošević in 2000, fewer than 50% of the population support the EU accession of the country (Spiegel Online, 2015).

A first move that would address the Russian media dominance was announced only recently by the German government (Sattar, 2015). During the next years, Germany will provide the Baltic States with financial and technical aid to set up state-owned Russian-language media outlets to counter the dominance of Russian-owned channels. However, the Allies should avoid simply countering Kremlin propaganda and they should instead offer the Russian-speaking minorities a real choice between Russian propaganda and more balanced media coverage. The Allies should therefore commit to strengthening bilateral or multilateral media cooperation, based on the principle of local ownership, with the aim of denying the Kremlin the chance to manipulate ethnic Russians abroad, and not just those in the Baltics.

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, *soft power* is as much an area of modern-day defence as hard power is. It relates not only to the societal and economic attractiveness that the “Western” model has in comparison to Russia, but also to hedging against Russian attempts to disqualify that model through manipulated media coverage. Balanced, unbiased and sober information policies assume a very prominent role in that regard. This becomes the more obvious in conjunction with the latest rhetorical threats by the Kremlin in the nuclear realm. These threats have been so masterfully crafted that certain Western defence analysts have reacted with hysteria. But as will be argued below, “nuclear hysteria” is not good guidance for policy.

THE NUCLEAR COMPONENT

As part of its hybrid warfare tactics Russia has repeatedly made hidden or open references to its nuclear capabilities. President Putin’s reminders that Russia is a great nuclear power that should not be “messed with” (quoted from Freeman, 2015) and Russian statements directly threatening specific Allies such as Denmark (Reuters, 2015) are all elements of power politics aimed at intimidating NATO Allies. Again, these tactics are not new, and both Moscow and Washington made repeated use of them during the Cold War, as the latest historical accounts prove (cf. Burr and Kimball, 2015).

In response, some calls, mainly from Washington-based experts, for formulating a new nuclear strategy for NATO or changing the Alliance’s nuclear posture have been made (cf. Colby, 2015). Proponents of such ideas argue that Russia could make use of a very limited number of tactical short-range nuclear weapons strikes (with a range of up to 500 km) in order to show resolve in case of a serious conventional crisis, deter outside forces from responding militarily, and consolidate territorial gains on its own terms.⁹

The problem some U.S. analysts see is that the Russian General Staff could feel tempted to use its nuclear weapons to intimidate the West, believing that it would not respond in kind. Even if NATO were willing to employ tactical nuclear weapons in return, they argue further (Kroenig, 2015), the relevant weapons would not be available quickly enough as NATO's only tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe (approximately 200) are spread over five countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) and would have to be generated first. Their response to this perceived shortcoming comes in the form of calls for additional forward-deployed nuclear weapons (possibly stationed in the Baltics and Poland) or for withdrawing from the bilateral U.S.-Russian Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty¹⁰. The latter proposal has been fuelled by U.S. claims – not publicly documented – that Russia has allegedly violated that agreement by test-flying a forbidden ground-launched cruise missile (U.S. Department of State, 2015).

Changing NATO's nuclear posture under the current circumstances would be a mistake that the Allies should avoid. First and foremost, NATO's nuclear guarantee hinges on the United States' ability to credibly convince any opponent that Washington would be willing to "trade" Boston, Los Angeles, or New York for Vilnius, Tallinn, or Riga if push came to shove. This basic logic underlying any extended nuclear deterrence guarantee (cf. Quinlan and Ogilvie-White, 2011) stands and falls with the psychological effect of the opponent (here, Russia) believing in the willingness of the nuclear guarantor (in this case the United States) to make extreme self-sacrifices. Whether additional nuclear weapons would seriously reinforce this calculus is more than questionable. Very likely, they would lead rather to heightened threat perceptions on the Russian side – an unintended side effect that is also a key lesson learned from the archives of the Cold War (cf. Pelopidas, 2015).

Second, such misleading calls would further expose and deepen the already existing cracks in the Alliance when it comes to nuclear policies.¹¹ Not only do some member states (such as Germany, Belgium, or the Netherlands) openly question the military value of the forward-based systems already in their countries (Borger, 2010), but public opinion polls conducted before the war in Ukraine also saw no majorities for such scenarios, either in the "old" or the "new" member states (Greenpeace, 2006), thus giving the Kremlin potential leeway to manipulate the public, which NATO should guard against.

Third, NATO's current nuclear posture is also directly linked to the Grotian realm of order. In 1997 the Allies assured Russia "that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons [or establish nuclear weapon storage sites] on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so." (NATO-Russia, 1997) It is important to recall that it took the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States and its Allies decades to elaborate a sophisticated political

and legal system of order to guard against unintended mutual nuclear annihilation. Scrapping even parts of that regime would not only be unwise from an institutional point of view – also with respect to the global nuclear order – but in the end it would also be highly irresponsible. Further on, from the viewpoint of liberal values, it would be more than problematic, given the possible catastrophic human consequences of nuclear weapons employment. As long as Moscow does not significantly change its nuclear posture – which does not seem to be likely at the moment (cf. Thielmann, 2015) despite all its nuclear sabre-rattling – NATO's strategists should leave the nuclear component untouched. Instead of falling into the trap of the Kremlin and breaking out in hysteria, the Allies should concentrate on those areas of power where there is real homework to do. The last, but certainly not least, area to engage with in the realm of power is the economic security dimension.

THE ECONOMIC SECURITY DIMENSION

In contrast to the years of the Harmel Report, economic interdependence between the Allies and Russia is much tighter today, which can both increase and decrease security, as shown by the economic sanctions imposed by the EU and individual NATO member states. The sanctions have already taught Russia this lesson and turned attention to the economic realm of power. However, the Allies should also be prepared for possible Russian counter-actions. To begin with, they should devote more attention to economically vulnerable member states.

Even though NATO is a military alliance with limited decision power on non-military issues, most NATO members are also part of the EU – which finds itself in the midst of the gravest political and economic crisis in its history. This crisis has also direct implications for NATO's future strategy towards Russia because it makes certain Allies much more vulnerable and prone to potential blackmail in the economic realm of power. It will be critical for NATO Allies to address these vulnerabilities and to better coordinate and link their policies with national and EU decisions.

The potential for the Kremlin to employ divide-and-rule tactics by exploiting the economic distress of several Southern and South-Eastern NATO states is clear (cf. The Economist, 2015). For example, the current Syriza-led Greek government could block NATO or EU decisions as a *quid pro quo* for much-needed loans from the Kremlin. Initial overtures in that direction have already surfaced (Coughlin, 2015). The scenario of a NATO Ally blocking a possible EU decision to reissue economic sanctions against Russia in January 2016 would be a political catastrophe. In addition, neighbouring Cyprus is dependent on Russian investment and has only recently signed a deal with Russia for military use of some of its Mediterranean ports (BBC, 2015). As a matter of fact, almost all of NATO's South-Eastern members are very dependent on Russian gas (cf. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2014).

Another example is the French government's deal to sell sophisticated military equipment to Russia. Despite the on-going war in Ukraine it took months of pressure from NATO Allies to convince the economically desperate Elysée to dump a lucrative €1.12 billion contract for the construction of two Mistral-type helicopter carriers for the Russian Navy, which was signed in June 2011 (Defense Industrial Daily, 2015).

These examples show that if NATO wants to close the collective security loopholes, it has to pay closer attention to the economic realm. NATO must not allow the Kremlin to exploit the economic heterogeneity that a 28-nation alliance naturally has. The EU's efforts to stabilize the precarious economies of its southern belt should not be seen as an exclusively European endeavour, but as common policies with strong implications for the common defence.

Altogether, the Hobbesian realm of power is today much more multidimensional in character than during the days of the Harmel Report. Aside from classical military measures to reassure the Allies such as those in the Baltics, NATO Allies will have to engage also in the soft power realms of civilian legislation, information policies, and economic interdependence in order to decrease their potential vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Russia. Particularly Russia's tactics of hybrid warfare demand coordinated counter-measures that combine these elements. Another contrast to the Cold War days is that nuclear overtures, as destabilizing and potentially dangerous as they are, have not led to any significant changes to the nuclear postures of either Russia or the Alliance yet. NATO would be extremely short-sighted to be the first to change this situation. Particularly in the nuclear and conventional realm of "hard" power NATO's further decisions could have serious negative implications for the Allies' continued interest in preserving the European security order. Here, in the Grotian realm of security, NATO Allies have to re-engage with Moscow, as the next section argues.

THE REALM OF ORDER

This section examines the Grotian realm of order, that is, institutionalized efforts to achieve mutual security through common rules, dialogue, and cooperation. As already mentioned, certain aspects of NATO's power-based response to Russia threaten to strain parts of the existing European security order. Other parts have been dysfunctional for several years due to the divergence in NATO and Russian interests. So far, neither the Allies nor Russia put forward a new agenda aimed at reinvigorating the elements of order. Compared to the Harmel days, NATO has considerably cut back the dialogue with Russia. Today, the element of engagement is almost absent. This section discusses the institutionalized realms of arms control and cooperative security with a focus on converging and diverging interests and

goes on to suggest how to move forward on these complicated issues. Finally, the open question of further NATO enlargement will be discussed before the analysis moves on to the realm of values in the section titled *The Realm of Liberal Values*.

ARMS CONTROL AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY

For many years, arms control instruments such as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) or the OSCE's Vienna Document on Confidence-Building Measures have provided European militaries with a sense of confidence that their operations would not be aimed at each other (cf. Zellner, 2010). Over the years, NATO's structures developed close political-institutional links to a whole range of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), and arms control agreements developed under the auspices of the OSCE (cf. Kühn, 2015). NATO has been an active participant in these policy instruments and a constant proponent of the concept of *cooperative security*¹² through arms control (ibid.).

With the current situation military confidence is almost completely gone. Large manoeuvres that go unchecked, military build-ups in close vicinity to borders, and non-transparency in military reforms are all eroding the security standard that Europe once enjoyed. Today, regular exchange of military information, particularly information about out-of-garrison missions of special forces, challenges inspections based on equal quotas, and militarily thinned-out zones in areas of heightened concern are needed more than ever. However, the current situation makes them extremely hard to achieve.

To begin with, the Putin leadership continues to have an interest in the policy instruments mentioned above; however, its interest runs partly counter to NATO's interest (President of Russia, 2007). In the Russian understanding, arms control measures should be designed to achieve two principal goals. On the one hand they should contribute to stability in the sense of preventing a large-scale war between Russia and an enlarged Alliance (OSCE, 2007). In that regard, Russia's and NATO's interests still converge to a certain degree, even though the continued Russian intimidations could make NATO's military planners question the Russians' seriousness. On the other hand, arms control should help to minimize NATO's military and political influence. The restraints of the 1997 Founding Act are typical in that regard. Another example is the failed Adapted CFE (ACFE) Treaty, through which Washington sought to achieve the withdrawal of Russian forces, from disputed areas in Moldova and Georgia (cf. Kühn, 2009). Until today, the treaty did not come into force because Russia did not withdraw its forces and the Allies did not ratify the ACFE in response.

If one accepts the Russian concept of security, which seems very much dictated by Hobbesian thinking (Mearsheimer, 2014), it becomes clear what arms control measures Russia is interested in. All possible agreements that would cement the sta-

tus quo (thus blocking further NATO enlargement to the East) and prevent a large-scale confrontation between NATO and Russia are potentially feasible for Moscow. But all agreements that would result in a potential change to the status quo to Russia's (perceived) detriment – such as NATO's linkage between the Russian forces' withdrawal and the ACFE ratification – are non-starters. From a Grotian point of view, Russia wants non-interference in its realm of order (the post-Soviet space), where Russia dictates the rules of the game. In short, Russia wants a *coexistent security order* vis-à-vis NATO (cf. President of Russia, 2014). The problem, however, is that this concept largely ignores the rights of weaker states such as Ukraine.

NATO Allies are thus confronted with a formidable dilemma, which extends from the narrower realm of arms control to the larger realm of cooperative security and, thus, to the overall European security order. On the one hand, NATO wants to avoid a military confrontation with Russia (NATO, 2014), which would partly speak for the kind of arms control measures the Kremlin has in mind. On the other hand, NATO does not want to give up on those Grotian principles of the European security order that guarantee state sovereignty and freedom of choice (ibid.), which runs counter to Moscow's principal interest – maintaining a sphere of influence as a hedge against NATO. In short, NATO wants a *common security order* where all states (including Russia) can find their place. The problem is that this concept continues to ignore and even negates the Russian concept of order.

The real problem behind these diverging interests is thus a fundamental disagreement between NATO and Russia about the order undergirding European security. This problem is best described in terms of spheres of influence. Yes, there already exists an "American" sphere of influence in Europe. However, it results from voluntary associations with NATO. The Russian sphere of influence, though, is a very different model which seeks to promote the interests of the Russian nation state by compromising major aspects of the sovereignty of other states.

The bigger puzzle behind these observations is that of NATO Allies deciding what they should do in regard to arms control and cooperative security. Without any doubt, after 15 years of stalemate on European arms control, fresh thinking is needed to address the military challenges Europe is facing. But most importantly it needs NATO to revive the dialogue with Russia. What is the prime purpose of an institutional clearing-house such as the NATO-Russia Council if the Allies frequently suspend the Council's work in times of crisis?

As there are currently no signs of renewed engagement in the NATO-Russia format, the OSCE, the only multilateral organization that played a useful role in the Ukraine conflict, comes into play. There, NATO Allies and Russia sit together as equal stakeholders. As a matter of urgency, the Allies should seriously consider reinvigorating the OSCE to help break the deadlock. Such efforts should include strengthening the dialogue on arms control measures, increasing the budget of the

organization and its ability to respond to crises in a timely manner and perhaps providing it with a legal personality.

One issue that should be high on the agenda is an open discussion about how to restore the Grotian tradition of a rule-based cooperative security order without compromising on the very principles set forth by the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The inviolability of frontiers, the non-use of force, and a clear commitment to basic human rights should be on the menu in addition to non-interference in internal affairs, the rights of people to self-determination, and the indivisibility of security. Finally, the OSCE's unique definition of security, which mirrors the theoretical trichotomy established in this intervention, should be preserved.¹³ In order to focus the process of preserving the OSCE's definition of security NATO Allies could pursue the convening of a high-level conference, a kind of "Helsinki 40+ Summit", within the next two to three years. NATO Allies must again re-engage with Russia on these complex issues in an open manner instead of reiterating those positions that have led to the negative tit-for-tat of the recent past.

THE ISSUE OF FURTHER ENLARGEMENT

To be clear, purely technical arms control solutions will not solve the larger problem of how to deal with Russia's security interests and the directly related problem of how to maintain a system of order that balances the diverging interests. For Russia, one of the primary concerns is the Helsinki principle of order of the "indivisibility of security" – meaning that states (or alliances) must not enhance their security at the expense of others. For NATO, the inviolability of frontiers and the sovereignty of states are of equal importance. Stressing these principles is one thing, but enforcing them is another.

If the war in Ukraine has shown anything, it is that NATO Allies will not go to war for Ukraine's territorial integrity. Even the issue of arming Ukraine with non-lethal military hardware (Daalder et al., 2015) is still disputed amongst NATO member states (cf. Walt, 2015). The basic fear of most Allies is that NATO could end up in a hidden, or worse, an open proxy war with Russia. Putin knows that and is therefore, tactically seen, in a better position. In Ukraine, Moscow certainly enjoys what Herman Kahn (1965) termed "escalation dominance" – meaning that Russia is more willing to go to considerable lengths here because the stakes for Russia are higher than for most NATO Allies. As for Putin, he has communicated that the war in Ukraine is of existential importance. For NATO, it is not. Ukraine is not a member and is thus not protected by the Article V guarantee.

Thus one basic insight here is that countries such as Ukraine or Georgia will not become NATO members in the foreseeable future. Both countries have open or protracted secessionist conflicts on their territories. In both of them, Russia has considerable leverage to escalate those conflicts at any time. In the military realm, the West's ability to stabilize those countries pales in comparison to the Kremlin's abil-

ity to destabilize them. Continuing to lead them to believe that there is a realistic prospect of NATO membership for them in the short- to mid-term would be dishonest and potentially dangerous – not so much for NATO, but for the countries concerned. Even if those countries would wish to become Alliance members, NATO's instruments for preventing Putin from blocking their accession are limited. Should NATO thus officially abandon its open door policy?

It should not. Rather, policymakers in Washington and Brussels must find a way to circumvent the current impasse and exert a cool-headed pragmatism until the situation has stabilized. Such a pause to enlargement may well last for some time, and it would rest on three basic premises. First, and most importantly, Russia will have to stop its illegal actions in Ukraine and other countries¹⁴ and will have to give the countries concerned reliable security guarantees – an endeavour complicated enough, given the notoriously unreliable stance the Kremlin has displayed in recent months. Second, Washington and its Allies would have to be willing to reach out again to Moscow and discuss the facts on the ground that Russia has helped to create in those countries – a policy basically asking for the virtues of restraint and strategic patience. Third, the non-NATO states near Russia should not be confronted with an “either-or” option, meaning that those countries should not think in terms of either subordinating their decision-making to Russia or joining the Alliance.

In that regard, NATO Allies should recall the lessons from the Harmel days. Back then, engagement with the Soviets was possible and led to increased stability, even though the Allies had no serious leverage to enhance the freedom and prosperity of the states under Soviet rule. The 1975 Helsinki principles were the results of a political understanding that the status quo was there to last for some time and that recognizing the status quo would contribute to preventing large-scale conflict (cf. Maresca, 1988). It is important to remember that it took Germany over 40 years to re-unite. The Baltic States waited more than 50 years for their independence. It took the people of the Soviet Union decades to overthrow their own dysfunctional system. Hopefully, it will not take that long for Russia to return to its European roots and for states such as Ukraine to achieve the full sovereignty to which they are entitled under the Grotian order.

To sum up the Grotian realm, the greatest difficulties and the most complex issues to tackle for NATO lie with re-establishing order. The institutional decay that preceded the Ukraine crisis has provided fertile ground for NATO and Russia to quickly move to a state of enmity and disengagement. Since the Allies are still interested in upholding the principles of order – ideally, together with Russia – they have to shoulder the burden of developing an agenda which would set forth areas of mutual interest with Russia. Such an agenda, giving effect to the second pillar of engagement in a Harmel 2.0 strategy, should not compromise on the core principles that the Al-

liance valued for a long time. But it would have to clearly identify which ones deserve immediate emphasis. The instruments of arms control, the paradigm of cooperative security, and a pause to enlargement should all be parts of such an agenda.

THE REALM OF LIBERAL VALUES

In the Harmel Report, the Kantian realm of liberal values was certainly the least developed. This was mostly due to the huge ideological gap between the West and the East. It was also due to recognition of the fact that direct interference into the politics of certain members of the Eastern Bloc would most likely prompt a severe crisis with Moscow. In this section, I touch upon the past policies of NATO Allies towards Russia in that realm and analyse the current intra-Alliance shortcomings which a new Harmel 2.0 strategy would potentially rectify. That this section is shorter than the previous sections – on power and order – is a recognition of the fact that NATO itself does not provide a genuine forum for debating liberal values with Russia, although other organizations – such as the OSCE with its tripartite security definition – do.

Since the end of the 1990s, and particularly with the coming into office of the George W. Bush administration, the realm of liberal values has claimed a very prominent role in the Allies' dealings with Russia. Focusing on Washington's special role helps to identify past mistakes in this realm. The United States' OSCE policy under President George W. Bush was twofold. On the one hand, efforts to strengthen the politico-military dimension of arms control were rejected (cf. Ghébal, 2002: 36). On the other hand, Washington increasingly promoted human rights standards in conjunction with its continued critique of Moscow's respective politics (Hopmann, 2009: 89). At the same time, clandestine U.S. democracy promotion efforts through state-sponsored NGOs (see Michael McFaul, quoted in Remnick, 2014) and intelligence further increased the tensions between Russia and the United States. The negative results of these policies were a deadlock of the OSCE and the aggravated crisis of European arms control (cf. Zagorski, 2010).

Another problem with this approach is that the more the West pushed Russia, the harder the Kremlin's actual clampdown on liberal values in Russia got (cf. Carothers, 2006). While this policy was thus certainly not to the advantage of Russian citizens, it also brought the OSCE and the institutionalized system of arms control in Europe into an imbalance. In hindsight, one could argue that the Allies over-emphasized liberal values to the detriment of the "older" elements of order in the realm of hard security. Make no mistake; today, even more than during the Bush years, Russia is an autocratic system with a huge legitimization deficit (see Remnick, 2014). The question is how to deal with this fact that NATO Allies cannot change right now, but which they certainly will continue to address.

To begin with, the Allies should focus on their own shortcomings in that regard, as a critic is only as convincing as his or her own credibility. Unfortunately, a grow-

ing number of Allies are increasingly diverging from NATO's core normative values. The current right-wing Hungarian government under Victor Orbán regularly shows undisguised sympathy for the Russian model of "managed democracy" – basically meaning the curtailment of fundamental civil rights (cf. Gati, 2014). Turkey, under its autocratic ruler, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has clearly departed from the Western-led model of political checks and balances, free media, and freedom of speech (cf. Akkoc, 2015). And last but not least, the United States' almost obsessive homeland security concern has led to an unprecedented personal data collection, effectively violating individuals' human rights (cf. Pilkington, 2014).

NATO officials have always stressed that the Alliance is a bond of values and that NATO enlargement has led to the flourishing of democracy and the rule of law in post-communist states (cf. Epstein, 2005). The Kantian tradition of advancing human security is a central pillar on which the Alliance and European security institutions rest. Diverging from it will undermine critiques of Russia. Particularly because Putin is attempting to establish Russia as an alternative societal value model to "the West" (cf. President of Russia, 2014), NATO members have to pay more attention to worrying developments which could erode NATO's normative basis and political coherence. A new Harmel 2.0 strategy should thus take into account the security implications of certain members departing from long-held liberal traditions.

With regard to Russia, the Allies should lower their expectations until the time is ripe for a serious dialogue with the Kremlin on liberal values. Until then, the Allies should not forget that they still enjoy systemic supremacy vis-à-vis Russia in the realm of liberal values. In spite of the economic discord within the Euro zone, the return to nationalist rhetoric in some NATO states and the undermining of liberal values described above, NATO Allies still continue to offer a more attractive and secure system than Russia (cf. Wilson, 2014). This contrast can, over time, be a powerful force for change in Russia itself, and NATO should ensure that any Harmel 2.0 strategy makes use of this fact – for its own sake and for that of Russians who demand the freedom, prosperity and dignity that they see as entwined with liberal values.

Keeping in mind the lessons learnt from the original Harmel Doctrine, NATO Allies should be careful about over-emphasizing the Kantian realm in their dealings with Russia today, yet remain committed to maintaining liberal values internally. So far, continued critique and disengagement have not led to the results the Allies may have envisioned. Even if the present author – among many others – considers that defending and promoting liberal values is right, being right does not automatically lead to getting justice.

CONCLUSION

The original Harmel Doctrine was so successful because it combined elements of power (through deterrence) and order (through engagement). As a result of engage-

ment, even the third element, liberal values, could be discussed with the Soviets. Today, the Allies are still in search of a doctrinal equivalent which would promise greater security in all three realms. A new Harmel 2.0 strategy should aim at preventing the Kremlin from dividing the Alliance along different political and economic lines while, at the same time, signalling to the Russian leadership that NATO is capable of re-engaging on European security and ready to do so without compromising the core ideals that make it strong. Again, a good balance of deterrence and engagement is needed.

To better fill the pending period of intensified contention and to avert worst case scenarios, the Alliance should reconsider its strategy vis-à-vis Russia. Yes, it needs the policies of power such as strengthened deterrence arrangements to reassure its Allies and to let the Kremlin know that it cannot interfere in the affairs of NATO countries. But it also needs the right policies. A multidimensional approach of preserving the remaining institutions of cooperative security in Europe, addressing hybrid warfare threats and securing the realms of economic and societal policies is best suited to make NATO more immune to divide-and-rule tactics. Changing NATO's nuclear posture should not become part of the equation.

Renewed engagement and cooperation are also needed, not least for the sake of the Ukrainian people, who are caught in the middle of the current conflict and suffer its consequences most acutely. As the arguments presented above have shown, NATO's current strategy is imbalanced because it over-emphasizes aspects of power. NATO should remember its successful strategy from the Cold War days, which gave equal effect to the Grotian tradition of cooperation, diplomatic dialogue, and institutionalized order. Strategic patience and cooperative security arrangements, including instruments of arms control, must go hand in hand with strengthened defence in order for the Allies to be ready to seriously discuss liberal values with Russia once the Russian leadership is ready for that.

Of course, NATO cannot achieve all that on its own. Many of the issues at stake go beyond the institutional authority of the Alliance and would involve the OSCE and the EU. What it needs in the first place is a coordinated leadership of NATO countries and the individual countries' support for such a multi-pronged strategy. And last but not least, it would need the Kremlin to accept that the real costs of the renewed confrontation by far outweigh the perceived benefits for Russia. Only a balanced approach that would take account of and address each of the realms identified in this intervention – power, order, and liberal values – stands a chance of achieving this and, in so doing, replicating the success of the Harmel doctrine in shoring up the European security order.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ I am particularly grateful to Nancy Gallagher (University of Maryland), who convinced me of the merits of Bull's approach.
- ² In the question and answer session following his speech given at the 24 October 2014 Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Putin underscored that "we have no need of getting involved in things, of ordering others around, but we want others to stay out of our affairs as well and to stop pretending they rule the world. That is all. If there is an area where Russia could be a leader – it is in asserting the norms of international law." (President of Russia, 2014)
- ³ The Report was accompanied by four Sub-Group Reports that concentrated on "East-West Relations", "Inter-Alliance Relations", "General Defence Policy", and "Relations with Other Countries". (NATO, 1967)
- ⁴ Sub-Group I (East-West Relations) of the Report was more outspoken on this issue, stating that there is "hope that the Eastern governments can gradually be persuaded of the advantages for them in helping to organise a Europe where states and communities with differing social systems cannot only co-exist in uneasy confrontation but can progress through détente to closer collaboration in a stable settlement for their mutual benefit." (NATO, 1967)
- ⁵ According to then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin, "the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake and a serious one at that." However, at the occasion of the signing of the Founding Act, Yeltsin also made clear that "in order to minimize the negative consequences [of NATO enlargement] for Russia, we decided to sign an agreement with NATO." (quoted in Lippman, 1997)
- ⁶ Russia gave this commitment in conjunction with signing the Adapted CFE Treaty.
- ⁷ In parallel to the so-called Medvedev European Security Treaty draft, Russia also tabled a classified draft of an "Agreement on Basic Principles" (U.S. Mission to NATO, 2009), which only became known to the public through disclosed U.S. diplomatic cables.
- ⁸ Under Article V of The North Atlantic Treaty, "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." (NATO, 1949)
- ⁹ For the last 15 years or so, the Russian military establishment has relied on the concept of "de-escalating strikes", meaning that should there be an existential threat to the state, the Kremlin would consider employment of a few tactical nuclear weapons as a means of signalling to any adversary that it could move further up the nuclear escalation ladder if the threat continues (cf. Zagorski, 2011: 24 et seq.).
- ¹⁰ The 1987 INF Treaty bans ground-based intermediate-range (from 500 to 5,500 km) nuclear and conventional forces.

- ¹¹ On 20 June 2015 Spiegel Online reported that at a NATO defence ministerial meeting in February 2015 France and Germany vetoed any nuclear response to the alleged Russian non-compliance (Spiegel Online, 2015b).
- ¹² The term *cooperative security* is meant to comprise a number of central tenets: increasing mutual security and predictability by means of reciprocity, inclusiveness, dialogue, a defensive orientation, transparency, confidence-building, and arms limitations (Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 1992). The aim of cooperative security is to generate interstate relations “in which disputes are expected to occur, but they are expected to do so within the limits of agreed-upon norms and established procedures.” (Nolan, 1994: 5)
- ¹³ The OSCE’s three dimensions are the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions.
- ¹⁴ Although whether pausing enlargement would be a sufficient incentive for Russia to do so is open to question.

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